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I. INTRODUCTION
Do you rankle at those amorphous rhapsodies about "Our Federalism" indulged in by judges who relegate civil rights litigants to
state courts?' Why would anyone see cases in which state officials
stand charged of violating the rights of individuals as presenting an
occasion for deference to the states? If federal rights take precedence
over state policies and practices, is it not perverse to prefer adjudication in the courts that have the strongest bias in favor of state interests? If jurisdiction is a duty and declining jurisdiction consequently
a dubious business, shouldn't we reject judge-made doctrine and
statutory interpretation that restrict access to federal court? And

*
Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School. I would like to thank Barry Friedman
and the editors of the Vanderbilt Law Review for organizing this Symposium and inviting me to
participate. I would also like to thank my son John for his encouragement and support, including his approval of the anecdote about him that appears in this Article.
1.
The expression "Our Federalism" appears most conspicuously in Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (declining jurisdiction to adjudicate a federal constitutional claim that
originated as a defense within a state criminal case). See also RailroadCommission of Texas v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500 (1941) (declining jurisdiction over federal case raising
constitutional claim but potentially resolvable on a state law ground).
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when the cases excluded involve matters of individual rights,
shouldn't our disapproval become active condemnation?
If we address the Supreme Court's federalism-based jurisdictional doctrine with questions of this kind, we will probably tend to
conclude that the Court has turned the proper hierarchy of values
upside down, either through inept reasoning or active hostility to
rights. In this essay, I turn away from that perspective and posit a
theory that harmonizes the Court's federalism with the notion that
federal rights take precedence over state policies and practices. I
suggest that the Court's supposedly deferential moves in the name of
federalism are little more than a strategy to exploit the state courts,
conscripting them into a national agenda. That is, the Court's federalism is in reality quite tame. While individual rights frequently
receive something decidedly less than expansive vindication, this
federalism nevertheless constrains the state courts in a system structured according to national interests and policies.
I then take on my own "tamed federalism" theory. I concede
that the theory does not fully represent all of the Court's reasoning
and motivation, but suggest that the theory still offers a satisfying
organizational framework for understanding jurisdictional doctrine.
The question becomes whether we should embrace tamed federalism
and what would untamed federalism look like? Our first impulse may
be to reject any notion of untamed federalism out of hand, on the
ground that it must necessarily and intolerably lead to the diminishment of individual rights in the shadow of overweening state interests. My purpose here, however, is to resist that impulse and to explore the risky positive values of untamed federalism. Is there something in state diversity and autonomy that we may find as compelling
as the enforcement of individual rights?
Or should we also resist this last question, with its loaded
structure? I will suggest that it is impossible to disentangle the production of human culture at the local level from the meaning that any
court can ascribe to individual rights. Though we concentrate our
attentions for the most part on the Supreme Court's linguistic formulations of rights, these formulations only coalesce within a legal and
political discourse that includes the voices of state judges. Moreover,
autonomy and diversity will inevitably emerge after each of the Supreme Court's attempts to carve the meaning of a right in stone. Efforts to constrain and tame federalism are inherently futile: concepts
of federal supremacy and the uniformity of individual rights represent
a fantasy of control. This Essay concludes with a plea for the aban-
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donment of that fantasy and a new search for a realistic, normative
role for state courts in the discourse concerning the meaning of rights.
II. TAMED FEDERALISM

Numerous jurisdictional doctrines overtly premised on deferential-sounding federalism translate into a scheme of maximizing the
enforcement of federal law.2 Many other jurisdictional doctrinal
twists withhold deference for the same federal end.3 Notwithstanding
the invocations of respect for state interests, as a general rule the
Supreme Court has shaped jurisdictional doctrine around federal interests: it uses the state courts as an abundant resource capable of
handling large quantities of work, and it preserves access to federal
courts whenever it perceives the state courts as inadequate. 4 The
simple realities of numbers defeat the notion that federal courts must
address all questions of federal rights. There are approximately
fifteen trial-level state judges for each federal district judge: to
charge the whole enterprise of federal rights enforcement to the federal courts would sacrifice the immense judicial resource offered by
the state courts. Despite any nagging mistrust of state courts, to exclude them from rights-enforcement would amount to a dysfunctional
failure to delegate.
Of course, different minds and different justices disagree about
exactly when state courts are inadequate-when the shift from deference to nondeference kicks in-and many of the doctrines shaped ac2.
See generally Ann Althouse, Tapping the State Court Resource, 44 Vand.L. Rev. 953
(1991) (expounding this thesis in much greater length).
3.
Id.
4.
The clearest example is the doctrinal structure dealing with state law based criminal
cases that will frequently present issues of federal law, arising under the Fourth, Fifth, and

Sixth Amendments. To permit these numerous cases to move routinely to federal court, for
example, by allowing the state court defendant to restate the federal issue as an affirmative
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, would overwhelm federal courts, and the Younger doctrine
prevents this problem. Younger preserves access to federal court for the rare case in which the

federal courts are willing to characterize the state courts as inadequate at the outset. See
Younger, 401 U.S. 37, discussed in Althouse, Tappingthe State CourtResource, 44 Vand. L. Rev.

at 978. After the state court has had its opportunity to handle the federal issue, it becomes
possible for the Supreme Court to act, though this form of review will be exceedingly rare and

dependent on the Court's own determination of the importance of the issue. And, it becomes
possible to gain access to a lower federal court for habeas corpus review, subject to a rightly
constrained doctrinal system. See, for example, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 757 (1991)

(denying habeas review if petitioner defaulted in asserting federal claim without cause in state
court and reading a summary state court opinion as a finding of default); Butler v. McKellar, 494
U.S. 407, 412-17 (1990) (denying habeas petitioner access to federal court to assert "new rule" of

constitutional law, with rare exceptions, and defining "new rule" very broadly).
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cording to federal interests thus remain controversial. 5 By and large,

however, the Supreme Court does not allow countervailing state interests and state policies to stand in the way of anything that seems
to need to be done in the service of federal policies. The real questions

in federal jurisdiction have less to do with hesitancy to intrude on the
work of state courts than with eagerness to impose work on them. In
making jurisdictional doctrine, the federal courts are, after all, de-

signing their own workload. This is the real self-interest at stake for
the life-tenured, salary-protected federal judge.

At the bottom of, say, the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction lies a sense that this work is insignificant docketclutter beneath the dignity of the federal judge. State judges receive
this work not because of respect for the integrity of the state's judicial
system, but because federal judges have turned up their noses at it.6
If the Supreme Court has structured habeas corpus to prevent federal
court review of all but the most flagrant violations of federal law, it
has shaped the federal workload to include only the righting of (what
it sees as) dramatic injustice, more modest state-court-work-checking
7
being unworthy of the attention of the federal judge.
A more activist, rights-enforcing Supreme Court justice would
view habeas corpus petitions as far more important--undeserving of
stigmatization as mere nit-picking-and would reject the Court's new
law of habeas corpus. s But this does not change the theory: federal
jurisdictional doctrine takes the perspective of the federal judge, who
takes what are perceived as the choice work assignments and relegates the rest to the state courts. The state courts are underlings, not
5.
Certainly the doctrinal structure outlined in the previous footnote is highly controversial. Many commentators condemn the Younger doctrine and the recent developments in
habeas corpus doctrine.
6.
See, for example, Ankenbrandt u. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992) (reaffirming the
longstanding exception and limiting it to cases involving divorce, alimony, and child custody).
The Ankenbrandt opinion justified the exception in terms of the states' traditional interest in
these areas, not, as I assert in the text, the federal courts' lack of interest. As has been widely
noted, there does not seem to be any more reason to observe state interests for these cases as
opposed to say, the various torts and contracts claims heard under diversity jurisdiction. See,
for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, FederalJurisdiction288-89 (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1994). The
lack of any grounding in state interests for distinguishing these cases suggests the accuracy of
the contention that federal, not state, interests are at work.
7.
See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). The Teague Court, in cutting off habeas
review where petitioners relied on "new rules" of constitutional law, created an exception for
rules that significantly increase "the likelihood of an accurate conviction" and that also
"implicatefs] the fundamental fairness of the trial." Id. at 313. In practice, a combination of the
Teague rule and this exception empowers the federal courts to shape their workload to screen
out the minor and include the major (more precisely: the recent Court's conception of what is
minor and what is major).
8.
See, for example, Butler,494 U.S. at 431-32 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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equal partners. 9 Despite the language of deference, they are objects of
exploitation.
One can explain the language of deference. First, it distracts
attention from the federal courts' rejection of the work they shunt to
the state courts. And second, it works as encouragement. To enlist
the state courts in the enterprise of enforcing the rights guaranteed
by federal law one says nice things to them about their capacities: the
'Myth of Parity"'10 as incentive, not truth.
When I ask my son John to mow the lawn, he tends to point
out that he can't help leaving lines of uncut grass between each strip
he mows and that I will criticize him for these failings afterwards.
Common sense counsels that I should tell him he certainly can do a
fine job of mowing the lawn and provide a little diplomatic instruction
about overlapping the strips as he works. I do not mention that I can
do better and that I'll need to check for uncut lines afterwards, because I want to maximize the likelihood of getting him to do some of
the work now. I'm also hoping that experience will lead to improvement over time. My words have very little to do with my opinion of
his present capacity.
This is a homely analogy, and the violation of rights ought to
stir deeper passions than uncut blades of grass. Mowing the lawn
incites less anxiety than mowing the law. Nevertheless, one must
acknowledge the potential benefits of increasing the number of hands
working on a task. That some are stronger, more dedicated, or more
skilled does not argue for giving the less skilled a pass. The less
skilled may improve through practice, the more skilled may correct
the flaws in the work of the less skilled, and, aside from the end result, members of a community have responsibilities and should not be
permitted to sit by when there is work to be done. If the lawn needs

9.
The position of state courts defined by jurisdictional doctrine tracks the positions of
the states themselves under the Tenth Amendment. While there is some indication that the
Court may immunize the states' governments from extremely intrusive demands of federal law,
see New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992), essentially the state may regulate only in
areas Congress has not chosen to preempt. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 548 (1985). Even where Congress has not acted at all, the force of the
commerce power alone has led the Court to restrict the states' power to legislate in areas
marked by federal interest. See, for example, Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450
U.S. 662, 669-71 (1981) (employing a dormant Commerce Clause analysis to invalidate an Iowa
statute).
10. See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1977). In his classic,
oft-cited article describing the preferability of federal court, Professor Neuborne debunks the
"myth" that the state courts are equally good. Many commentators agree and criticize the Court
for presuming the parity of state courts. My point is that the Court has a federal-interest-based
motivation to invoke the myth.
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mowing, twelve-year-old children should not be heard to invoke incompetence, and we rightly shake our heads at parents who attempt
to accomplish everything on their own while their children lie about.
Similarly, state courts may gain experience enforcing rights if
they are given this task to do. If they miss some spots, then federal
jurisdiction ought to provide a second pass. And, since state courts
are part of the federal system, constitutionally responsible for the
enforcement of federal rights, we should not accept the contention
that they may ignore federal rights on the theory that the federal
courts do a better job. Their participation is part of their membership
in the whole.
Any number of doctrines-Younger," habeas, 12 the Eleventh
Amendment," the definition of "arising under" jurisdiction, 4 the permutations of Section 198315-represent decisions to exploit the states
in the enterprise of enforcing federal law. With this interpretation in
mind, the rhetoric of deference reads as cheerleading, encouragement,
wheedling a decent performance out of the state courts whose per-

11. See note 4.
12. Id.
13. See Edelman v. Jordan,415 U.S. 651 (1974). Edelman allows rights claimants to take
advantage of the legal fiction established in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), when they
seek prospective relief, but not when they seek retrospective relief. Initially, this meant that
plaintiffs could go to federal court for the announcement of what their rights are and for the
future-looking injunction, but the tedious administrative work of parceling out past damages to
individual claimants would be the state courts' job. See Norman B. Lichtenstein, Retroactive
Relief in the Federal Courts Since Edelman v. Jordan: A Trip Through the Twilight Zone, 32
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 364, 375 n.73 (1982) (noting that plaintiffs in Edelman received their
retrospective payments in state court). In later case law, however, the Court cut off the state
court path to retrospective relief. See Will v. Michigan Departmentof State Police, 491 U.S. 58
(1989).
14. Merrell Dow PharmaceuticalsInc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813-14 (1986). In
Merrell Dow, the Court declined to define § 1331 jurisdiction to cover all cases in which federal
law is a necessary element of a state law cause of action. The Court justified this interpretation,
over a strong dissenting opinion written by Justice Brennan, by citing the lack of federal
interest in the case at hand (a products liability personal injury case).
15. For example, in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), the Court forced prisoners
litigating about prison disciplinary procedures, and relying on federal law to use habeas corpus,
even though their claim fit literally into 42 U.S.C. § 1983, thus forcing them to present the
claim to a state court rather than going directly to federal court. Notably, the Court wrote:
The relationship of state prisoners and the state officers who supervise their confinement is far more intimate than that of a State and a private citizen. For state prisoners,
eating, sleeping, dressing, washing, working, and playing are all done under the watchful eye of the State, and so the possibilities for litigation under the Fourteenth Amendment are boundless. What for a private citizen would be a dispute with his landlord,
with his employer, with his tailor, with his neighbor, or with his banker becomes, for the
prisoner, a dispute with the State.
Id. at 492. Despite protestations about the state's interest and expertise in hearing these claims
and the need for "comity," this language suggests that prison litigation is simply too lowly and
inconsequential to justify consuming the time of a federal judge.
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formance is genuinely needed. Federal courts, in the absence of an
expansion that would transform the very qualities that make them
different from the state courts, 16 cannot intervene in every ongoing
state court prosecution and adjudicate each issue of federal law as it
arises. Nor can they exhaustively check every state criminal prosecution afterwards for each violation of federal rights. The Supreme
Court certainly cannot review each determination of federal law. Full
enforcement of federal law thus demands the participation of the
state courts, and doctrines of jurisdictional federalism are roughly
designed to secure it.
If I overstate the extent to which the Court has constrained
and tamed federalism, I think I am at least correct that there is a
decided trend in this direction in much of the doctrine. One can fairly
successfully mine the case law, extract this theory as the preferred
meaning of judicial federalism, and accordingly condemn nonconforming doctrine. This is the theory by which judicial federalism can have
the wide scope of operation the Court seems to think it deserves and
still not pose a threat to national interests. One might ask profitably
at this point whether we ought to agree with the majority of the Court
that federalism ought to continue to mean something, 17 but instead I
want to ask a quite different question. Assuming we embrace federalism, do we want tamed federalism-or does purging the risk out of
federalism inherently drive&
out its desirable effects?
III. UNTAMED FEDERALISM
Let me return to my homely grass-cutting scenario. I only
wanted John to carry out a job I would otherwise have done, to do it
the way that I would do it, and to follow specifications I had drawn
up. I tell John to cut the grass when I think it's gotten too long. I
expect John to use the hand mower because I disapprove of power
16. See Jon 0. Newman and Stephen Reinhardt, Are 1,000 Federal Judges Enough?, N.Y.
Times A17 (May 17, 1993) (reporting the debate on the issue of increasing the federal judiciary).
See generally William H. Rehnquist, Seen in A Glass Darkly: The Futureof the FederalCourts,
1993 Wis. L. Rev. 1.
17. I think it is apparent that federalism will continue to mean something, in part because
judges assume so. Aside from the question of the extent to which the Constitution demands an
independent role for the states as a counterbalance to national power, purely functional considerations justify it. In the particular case of judicial power, there are simply not enough federal
courts to handle all issues of federal law. A dramatic increase in the number of federal courts
does not appear likely to occur, and in any event, such an increase would change the character
of the federal courts, arguably making them more like the state courts and undercutting the
reasons for the increase.
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mowers. Similarly, tamed federalism simply forces the states to carry
out a dictated national agenda. Indeed, this may suggest another
reason for the deferential talk in the case law: the language of separateness, sovereignty, and deference conceals the essential inferiority
of the state courts' position. State courts merely perform work, as
lowly functionaries of the federal government, and if they are left
alone to do their work it is only because separate functioning is seen
as an effective strategy for getting work done.
Suppose John questions my lawn agenda and suggests that we
abandon cutting altogether and allow the grass to reach its natural
length. Maybe those purplish seed plumes will prove esthetically
pleasing. Note that John would not be simply disengaging from the
project of looking after the yard and doing the work badly. He would
be participating on an unexpectedly vital level, asserting a creative
role. I could insist on controlling the homeowner agenda, trusting
John to mow the lawn by himself, but recognizing no valid independence beyond following my instructions-tamed federalism. On the
other hand, I could actually entertain the notion that I do not have
sole possession of some sort of ultimate knowledge of the one true
method of lawn care. Despite my deep belief that I know better, I
might benefit from crediting his opinion on the subject. I am not saying I would welcome endless argument, allow clever words as an escape from work, or refrain from imposing a controversy-ending judgment at some point. But I am saying that listening to his different
perspective and perhaps even trying things his way for a while might
lead to a better policy and might enhance the quality of his participation in the general project of householding.
A less-tamed federalism would seek independent contributions
from the states to the creative process of law- and policy-making. It
would tolerate divergence for the sake of the vitality provided by
counterpoint agendas. Instead of attempting to discipline the state
judges into casting aside local passions and prejudices and emulating
the federal judges in the national mission, it would actually value the
state judges' opinions-as expressed in the contextualized voice of the
local culture. It would be the very thing federal court primatists fear.
It would be what the theory set forth in the previous section discounts
as unimportant in current doctrine and seeks to control.
How could one ever view this as desirable? Let's reexamine
the language we conventionally use. The local culture gives rise to
"passions" and "prejudices," while federal law embodies and protects
"treasured, enduring rights." Is this really the case? Where does our
sense of the content of the treasured federal rights come from? I want
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to suggest that it must arise and grow over time within diverse and
dispersed local cultures.
Over the course of this century, jurisprudence has abandoned
the belief that there is one true law. Whether the rubric is legal realism, legal process, a "living Constitution," critical legal studies, postmodernism, or law as narrative, almost no serious legal thinker conceptualizes rights as preexisting tangible objects. Even textualists
and originalists of any sophistication recognize the complexity and
uncertainty inherent in the enterprise of defining rights. The rhetoric
of rights often leads us into speaking about them as if they were tangible objects-judges thus "withhold" rights, as though they were
perversely hoarding them in the backroom, or judges "cut" them back,
as though they could mow rights like grass. Indeed, we often sense
that we need to speak about rights as if they were real, tangible objects in order to prevent judicial decisions of which we disapprove:
Justice Brennan steadfastly conveyed this vision of rights as he argued well and passionately for extensive protections for the individual. 18 But the idea of uniform rights is an artifact of a mindset few of
us retain.
We still talk about uniformity. We still teach Martin v. Hunter's Lessee's and justify federal supervision of the state courts' use of
federal law as though, like Justice Story, we thought disuniformity
were "evil" and "truly deplorable."20 Even though our century's jurisprudence ought to lead to the realization that the law will inevitably
fail to cohere into unified meaning, we still profess to be "shocked,
shocked"2' to find that the law varies from place to place. It seems
odd that we draw upon Story's mindset when we so conveniently
sneer at his Swift v. Tyson whenever we teach the Erie doctrine.22 Yet
the idea is the same: Story relied on the federal courts to unify the
law and to whip the ignorant state judges into line.23
18. See, for example, Teague, 489 U.S. at 326-45 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
20. Id. at 348.
21. The reference is to the movie "Casablanca," where Police Perfect Captain Louis
Renault, upon instructions to close Rick's Caf6 Amricain, feigns that he is "shocked, shocked, to
find that there is gambling going on in here," seconds before his own winnings are delivered to
him.
22. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 1 (1842)).
23. Erie is so familiar to us now and Swift so notoriously overruled that we may have lost
sight of Story's original vision, which included the value of uniformity so important in Martin.
Story expressed the hope in Swift that federal court independence in determining the principles
of "general law" would lead to a uniform, enlightened common law, particularly in commercial
law cases like Swift. He thought (revealing that he may really have believed in the superiority
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Uniformity is an idea we respond to. When I teach Erie, I linger on Swift, I translate Story's Latin phrase 24 for the students:
' There will not be one law at Rome, another at Athens; one law now,
another hereafter; but one eternal and immortal law shall bind together all nations throughout all time." And I confess that every time
I say that in class, I get a warm, tingly chill! I think it is poignantly
beautiful even if it is a delusion-I feel the same way about many of
Justice Brennan's opinions.
There is something important in this warm feeling that uniformity generates. It is not that the true, uniform rights really are
there as tangible objects though. It is that we respond on a deep level
to the project of seeking the good. But that project occurs by a far
sloppier method than either Story or Brennan concedes in his opinions. 25 The Supreme Court's capacity to give meaning to the rights
outlined in the text of the Constitution needs the support of local cultures that believe in those rights and their importance and local
judges who inject that belief into their legal decisions.
Human beings produce values on many different levels-individuals, families, religious organizations, small communities,
interest groups. Among the strongest, most enduring conglomerations of human beings producing values in our country are the states.
The states are not simply small subdivisions of the nation; they have

of federal judges after all) that the federal courts would figure out the best version of the law
and the state courts, seeing the light, would all sign on to this version. Unfortunately, the
states failed to behave in expected sheeplike fashion and the law became even more disuniform
than it would have been with each state varying, for the states and the federal courts ended up
varying, often within a single state, leading to "deplorable mischiefs" that inspired the Erie
Court to overrule Swift. Federal courts are no longer seen as a remedy for the "evil" of state-tostate diversity in the common law. Erie leaves us with the modest goal of avoiding intrastate
disuniformity. The federal courts must slavishly follow state court interpretations of common
law, superior capacity to discern better rules notwithstanding.
24. Swift, 41 U.S. at 19 ("Non erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia posthac;
sed et apud omnes gentes, et omni tempore una eademque lex obtinebit." (quoting Cicero)).
25. Swift v. Tyson could be read not as an effort to unify the law through the use of the
superior federal courts' power to ascertain what the true common law is, but as an attempt to
increase the number of divergent voices speaking about the law. In liberating federal courts
from the obligation to follow state court common law precedent, Swift increased the potential for
different versions of the law. This is not, however, the standard interpretation of Swift. Generally, Swift is presented as an effort to facilitate a process of arriving at a uniform set of rules,
particularly with respect to commercial law: Story anticipated that the common law process,
handled skillfully, would produce a sort of Uniform Commercial Code. See, for example, R. Kent
Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old Republic 332-43 (U. of
N.C., 1985). Story incorrectly predicted that state courts would follow along after the
persuasive decisions the federal courts were expected to issue. The failure of this prediction is
one of the pragmatic reasons for Erie.
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decided cultures, traditions, and histories-longer than the nation's.26
Much of what they have stood for is pernicious (one can say that of
the nation as well), but much of what is good also emerged from the
states. Local culture leaches into the legal process through state
judges. This is what we may fear, but is it not a complex process
through which a vast assortment of values is tried out? Is it not a
process through which we have the opportunity to view and contemplate new formulations of law, some of which may be good? The
feared "passions and prejudices" of the states also become the rights
we treasure. I live in a state that harbored a strong passion against
slavery, whose supreme court stood up to the national government in
1858.27 That same state court was a pioneer in the creation of criminal procedural rights in the nineteenth century. 28 When federal law
later affirms these rights, is that move not supported by the legal
culture generated in some of the states?
The Warren Court's landmark decisions in the area of constitutional criminal procedure did not come out of the blue, but followed
the decisions that some state courts had already made: the Supreme
Court simply built the constitutional floor that brought the lagging
states up to an acceptable level. Roe v. Wade, startling though it was
at the time, took place against a backdrop of state legislative consideration of the subject and concurrent public debate. 29 We may still
argue about whether the Court ought to have waited longer,3o allowed
more debate and social ferment to have taken place at the local level
26. Professor Briffault makes a strong argument that the values of federalism equate with
the values of small subdivisions of power and thus include cities as well as states. Richard
Briffault, "W'hat About the 7sm?" Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary
Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1303, 1309-17 (1994) (discussing the rise of local federalism and
the role of local governments). There is much to this position, however I would emphasize that
it is not mere smallness that contributes value, but the existence of thriving cultures and
traditions. In this respect, many cities do equate with states. I live in a city (Madison), as well
as a state (Wisconsin), that draws a sense of allegiance from its inhabitants. Local places have
meanings far deeper and more vital than administrative efficiency or even closeness to the
electorate. They offer a shared (though always contestable and changing) tradition that binds
(and divides) their inhabitants and provides a fertile ground that may produce ideas about
government that may differ from the ideas that arise elsewhere.
27. See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1858) (reversing Wisconsin Supreme Court
decision which found the Fugitive Slave Law unconstitutional).
28. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, CriminalLaw and State Constitutions: The Emergence of
State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1141, 1144-47 (1985).
29. See David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of
Roe v. Wade 270-334 (Macmillan, 1994). There was a great deal of debate in the popular and
medical press. Id.
30. The legal debate centering on the right of privacy (as opposed to the advisability of
legislative change) was fairly new. There was little significant fermentation of the privacy issue
within the state courts. See id. at 335-472.
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before federalizing the right to choose an abortion, but the fact remains that the Court did not act and perhaps could not have acted
without preliminary developments at the state level. Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg has eloquently questioned the sweeping approach
taken in Roe and suggested that the issue of abortion could have been
approached more modestly and to better effect if the Court had
'merely struck down the extreme Texas law and [gone] no further on
that day."3' 1 Perhaps the Supreme Court's attempt to resolve too
much, too soon and to foreclose local consideration of the issues contributed to the instability of the right that exists today.
In Bowers v. Hardwick,32the Court could not see protection for
homosexual behavior in the Fourteenth Amendment, though the
paths of reason toward that outcome seem obvious to many commentators. Justice White's opinion dwells on the social context of hatred
and stigmatizations 3 Many observers would like to see the Court rise
above these local passions and prejudices, and, of course, theoretically
it can. But in practice, it often cannot. Justice Powell, whose fifth
vote produced the outcome in Bowers, later admitted that he was
probably wrong.34 It is interesting that this insight came to him after
31. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1199
(1992) (James Madison Lecture on Constitutional Law). In the words of Justice Ginsburg.
In most of the post-1970 gender-classification cases, unlike Roe, the Court... approved
the direction of change through a temperate brand of decisionmaking, one that was not
extravagant or divisive. Roe, on the other hand, halted a political process that was
moving in a reform direction and thereby, I believe, prolonged divisiveness and deferred
stable settlement of the issue.
Id. at 1208.
Here, Justice Ginsburg regrets that Roe short-circuited salutary efforts in the state legislatures. Elsewhere in her article she notes the importan(i of judicial restraint in resolving issues
and the need to allow room for "dialogue" with other voices. Noting that federal judges are
dependent on the political branches, she writes:
Mindful of that reality, the effective judge ... strives to persuade, and not to pontificate.
She speaks in "a moderate and restrained" voice, engaging in a dialogue with, not a diatribe against, co-equal departments of government, state authorities, and even her own
colleagues.
Id. at 1186.
32. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
33. Id. at 190. Justice White articulated the issue as "whether the Federal Constitution
confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the
laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long
time." Id. Note that his sense of the meaning of the Constitution drew on the existing practices
in the states. Justice Blackmun writing in dissent did not contradict the sense that "history and
tradition" provide the source for the right of privacy, he simply located the issue at a higher
level of abstraction ("sexual intimacy"). Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
34. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality at 667 (cited in note 29). Powell asserted that Bowers
was "not a major case," and that "one of the reasons I voted the way I did was the case was a
frivolous case" which litigants used "justto see what the Court would do." Id. This astounding
comment about what most Court observers see as an extremely important case reveals a
problem with pushing courts to decide cases presented only in an abstract setting (as in
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he left the Court. In practice, as a judge, perhaps he could not extricate himself from the constraints of the culture he had the power to
affect. As a private citizen, straightforward reasoning from principle
may become more accessible. (This may be why we law professors
have such an easy time perceiving flaws in the Court's opinions.) In
the years since Bowers, state courts have begun to extend the protection the Supreme Court withheld.ss They rely, as they must, on provisions in their state constitutions, and as they do they create the new
context within which the United States Supreme Court will some day
reexamine the question.
The Court has not yet outlawed the death penalty in part because not enough states have rejected it under their own constitutions.36 While one may assert that the Court ought to forge ahead on
its own and define "cruel and unusual punishment" at the federal
level, and that it indeed has the power to do so without waiting for
the states to act first, it holds back, waiting for this development.
The power of the Supreme Court to make its grandiose moves
that drag all the states up to a uniform standard perhaps only comes
into being because other courts have had a place to say different
things about the law. Whatever the present condition of the Supreme
Court case law, are there not always other courts, many of them state
courts, spinning out new strands of legal culture that will some day
form patterns perceptible to a Supreme Court that will then announce
a new right? The right does not fall from the sky or emerge through
the pure force of judicial wisdom; it forms from a culture that must
American Booksellers Assn v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), the case discussed in the
Part IV). The judges, in their isolation from real world experiences may issue a blithe, illconsidered opinion. Only later, after witnessing the public response or the harm wrought by the
decision, does the judge realize the importance of the case and upon further thought view the
decision as wrong. Compare note 50 (indicating that the overruling of Minersville School
District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), was a response to harsh treatment of Jehovah's
Witnesses that followed). Allowing the question to develop in a concrete context before issuing
the decision, admittedly delaying the announcement of a particular rule, could avoid this
dysfunctional exercise of judicial power. This said, it should nevertheless be noted that the
Supreme Court has also gone to the opposite extreme, exaggerating the need for a concrete
context far beyond what is required for competent judicial decision making. Compare Whitmore
v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (emphasizing effect of the requested remedy on the individual
plaintiff) and Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (same) with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962) (emphasizing importance of concrete context to quality ofjudicial decision making).
35. See, for example, Texas v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (voiding Texas
law banning same-sex only sodomy); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992)
(voiding Kentucky law banning same-sex only sodomy).
36. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1977) (surveying state laws in determining
whether application of death penalty for rape is "cruel and unusual punishment"); Edmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (surveying state laws in determining that death penalty in
felony murder cases is unconstitutional).
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begin somewhere. It is absurd to think that nine cloistered, insulated, well-established human beings should or could generate this
culture. (Justice Powell,working on Bowers v. Hardwick, told his law
clerks that he had never met a homosexual!) 7 This is not to say that
worthless or actively bad patterns do not also form at the local level,
only that the lawsaying vitality that produces what is good must exist
within this seething complexity.
Pronouncements from on high that bear no relation to life as
lived by real human beings are not just hard to take, they are impossible to make. The Supreme Court cannot merely announce rights in
its supreme wisdom. It must draw from what has gone before in
shaping those rights; it can only be an intermediary. Other courts do
not merely carry out the Supreme Court's dictated agenda, they express and constantly change the mix of ideas that makes it possible
for the Supreme Court to speak at all.
The fact that some states reflect repellent values is scarcely a
reason to withdraw regard for the states. For values to be repellent,
someone must be repelled: there must exist other small communities
capable of generating competing values. Indeed, there will always be
small communities-I think I live in one-that generate values that
may be quite positive, but will never become widespread enough to
move the intermediary federal government to lurch forward and impose these values on all of the states. Nor is there any point where
this process is complete. There is an endless production of culture in
which the federal government plays a role.
To what extent then do we want to control lawsaying at the
local level? To what extent do we want to tame federalism? I only
want to state that this is the central question, not to argue for maximum freedom in complexity. As we vary in degree of risk-adversity
and optimism, we make different decisions about how much control of
local diversity we want.
IV. THE MARKETPLACE OF FIRST AMENDMENT

IDEAS

Consider the First Amendment pornography debate as played
out in the Seventh Circuit case of American Booksellers Association v.
Hudnut.38 The local democratic process in Indianapolis led to the
adoption of the innovative and highly controversial anti-pornography

37.
38.

Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality at 658-59 (cited in note 29).
771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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ordinance promoted by Professor Catharine A. MacKinnon. 9 Using
an assertedly feminist approach, MacKinnon challenged the existing
Supreme Court conception of obscenity regulable under First
Amendment doctrine. Instead of tracking the definition propounded
0
in Miller v. California,4
and barring "patently offensive" material
that "appeal[s] to prurient interest" and has "no serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value," the ordinance attacked
"pornography,41 which it defined as sexually explicit material depicting the "subordination!' of women. The ordinance reflected a fundamental shift in the reasoning behind the regulation of sexually
graphic materials. The Supreme Court's doctrine rested on ideas
about the "obscene": the problem of shocking those who do not wish
to consume the material and arousing disfavored feelings in those
who do. The Indianapolis ordinance, though it would regulate much
of the same sort of material, addressed the very different problem of
violence against women believed to result from the availability of
material that shows women as objects of sexualized power.
This is a significant decision point: should this fundamental
shift be adopted generally, as a matter of First Amendment law?
More accurately: should a particular locality be tolerated, at least
temporarily, as it asserts a revisualized version of First Amendment
law and attempts a new approach to regulation? One might have
allowed the city some time to work within the ordinance: see what
lawsuits might arise. The statute did not authorize public enforcement, but instead gave a cause of action to those who could show they
suffered an injury causally related to the use of pornography. One
might have waited to see which specific materials would become the
subject of lawsuits, how the litigants would interpret the terms of the
ordinance, and even, perhaps whether the rate of sexual assault in
Indianapolis would decline. One might have chosen to see how the
local state courts would have framed these issues and assessed the
harms within the meaning of the statute.
Instead, a federal court entertained a suit by an association of
bookstores before the ordinance even went into effect. Addressing the
ripeness issue, Judge Easterbrook wrote:

39. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1985). Note that it was a city, not a state, that enacted the
legislation, however, it would have been a state court that would have addressed the question in
the first instance if the federal courts had not acted.
40. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
41. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 324.
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[Tihe dispute may be resolved without reference to the administration of the
statute. We gain nothing by waiting. Time would take a toll, however, on the
speech of the parties subject to the act. They must take special care not to release material that might be deemed pornographic, for that material could lead
to awards of damages. Deferred adjudication would
produce tempered speech
42
without assisting in resolution of the controversy.

Expressing a firm commitment to rights and providing fast

relief for rights claimants, Judge Easterbrook took the conventional
activist position. In doing so, however, he excluded the voices of those
who believed in the values embodied in the ordinance, and we lost the
opportunity to explore a fundamental controversy about what rights
should be. Indeed, the judge did not merely cut short the process on
the ground that it was not worth the risk to gain the expanding dialogue about the meaning of rights, he denied that anything could
occur: 'Wegain nothingby waiting."
Judge Easterbrook went on to hold that the statute violated
the First Amendment. Despite the momentous dangers posed by pornography-and Judge Easterbrook did not slight those dangers or
discount the causal connection between pornography and violence
against women4S-the First Amendment doggedly favors speech and
more speech, speech across the broad range of possibility, all the way
to the most pernicious. According to Judge Easterbrook, other governments-totalitarian governments-rely on suppression, the promotion of "dogma" and "stasis" to "enslave" individuals.4 But our
government liberates thought, which facilitates the ongoing process of
change. He wrote:
Change in any complex system ultimately depends on the ability of outsiders
to challenge accepted views and the reigning institutions. Without a strong
guarantee
of freedom of speech, there is no effective right to challenge what
45
is.

There is irony here. Judge Easterbrook structured jurisdictionaldoctrine to cut short dialogue about the meaning of the First Amendment. He ensured that the state court judges would not have their
say. There could be only one true meaning of the First Amendment
and all alternative voices needed to be suppressed at the earliest possible moment. There would be no marketplace of ideas about the
meaning of the First Amendment.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 327.
Id. at 325.
Id. at 327.

45.

Id. at 332.
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Perhaps we should not risk it. Judge Easterbrook regretfully
accepted the inevitable consequence of many serious harms as he
stood on First Amendment principles: these harms would have to be
borne. No decision could avoid all harm. Then why not endure a
period of uncertainty and debate? If an intense process of debating
the meaning of the First Amendment had been allowed to unfold
through a series of state court cases and not precluded by the federal
court's preemptive strike, we might very well have ended with a
stronger and more widely shared commitment to freedom of speech.
The grand First Amendment values that galvanized the generation that lived through the suppression of books like Ulysses and
Lady Chatterley's Lover and with the abuses of McCarthyism have
calcified into smug truisms that elite judges dispense with officious
constitutional correctness. The First Amendment can become a desiccated and abstracted string of words, which, because of the power of
judges, fails to yield to the intense experience of harms about which a
new generation feels deep passion. If First Amendment values are to
survive, perhaps they must be released from the authoritarian grip of
the omniscient federal judge. I understand the argument, embraced
by Judge Easterbrook, that would place First Amendment rights
above the fray of a dynamic culture, but the attempt to isolate and
abstract these rights may itself undermine them. As people lose
touch with the passionate experiences that led to the creation and
fortification of a right, they begin to see it as an imposition from callous side-liners who do not face the abuses and dangers of real life as
experienced by ordinary people.
In a fairly short space of time, the character of the federal judiciary can shift. To what extent will the meaning of constitutional law
be affected by the persons appointed by President Bush, rather than
Michael Dukakis, the candidate he defeated? Within that presidential election, there was a debate about rights that appeared pivotal as
the polls moved Bush into a lead which he maintained through the
election. The issue was the constitutionality under the First Amendment of requiring public school teachers to lead students in the daily
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance. Dukakis relied on a passionless
announcement that the requirement violated the First Amendment. 4 6
46. Dukakis relied on an advisory opinion from the Massachusetts Supreme Court. See
Opinion of the Justices to the Governor, 372 Mass. 874, 363 N.E.2d 251 (1977). An advisory
opinion is, of course, the ultimate in judicial abstraction and is forbidden in federal courts. The
United States Supreme Court could not review this advisory opinion-at least not without some
substantial torque on justiciablity doctrine. But see ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605
(1989) (interpreting standing doctrine to make it possible to review a state court judgment in a
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He exhibited the robotic I-am-compelled stance typical of many
judicial opinions, even though the Supreme Court case he relied on,
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,47 did not cover the
situation presented by the law he vetoed. In Barnette, the Court
recognized the First Amendment right of students to decline to recite
the Pledge. 48 Teachers present an importantly different situation:
they are not compelled to take their jobs as children are compelled to
attend school, and they experience numerous constraints and
compulsions in their classroom speech.49 Moreover, when Justice
Jackson announced the right in Barnette he wrote in an eloquently
passionate style capable of engaging the hearts of the general public.
Jackson's words are powerful not because of their technical
correctness, but because they reach out to the general public and offer
words that explain the exigencies of law within an image of common
values:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein. 5

While the students' refusal to recite the Pledge would easily
have appeared pernicious to Americans dedicated to winning the war
at that time, Jackson wisely shaped his opinion to show how the First
Amendment embodied the values that the nation was fighting to preserve. 51 Michael Dukakis did nothing to relieve the public sense that
the law was a cold imposition, alien to deep human feeling; not a
product of communal values, but a technical legalism that governed

case that could not have been brought in the first instance in federal court because of lack of
standing). The legislature passed the law over the veto, only to be met with an executive
department refusal to enforce it, see Op. Mass. Atty. Gen. No. 34 (1976/1977) (holding the
statute void under the First Amendment), which ensured that the law would never be tested in
a more concrete context, since the law never produced a real case with an actual teacher
refusing to comply.
47. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
48. Id. at 642.
49. See Opinion of the Justicesto the Governor, 363 N.E.2d at 254.
50. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. Barnette overruled Minersville School District v. Gobitis,
310 U.S. 586 (1940), a decision with only one dissenting opinion, a mere three years after it was
issued. What had changed? The most obvious change was the knowledge of the real experience
of Jehovah's Witnesses, who had been subject to widespread harrassment and physical assaults,
as well as thousands of school expulsions. See David Whitman, Behind the Pledge Flap: The
Nasty History of Our Oathof Allegiance, Washington Post C1 (September 18, 1988).
51. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 961, 977-79 (1992).
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without regard to sentiment.52 It was George Bush who stirred public
emotion and tapped the vitality of communal values, 5s who won the
election and, consequently, the power to appoint federal judges.
It was also during the period of this presidential campaign
that the Senate rejected President Reagan's nomination of Robert
Bork as Supreme Court Justice. The rejection of Bork grew out of his
failure to embrace the right of privacy, which he explained in coolly
academic terms, emphasizing the compulsions of history and text."
Bork's aversion to passion in legal interpretation is reflected in the
title of the book he wrote after his defeat: The Tempting of America:
The Political Seduction of the Law. 55 Bork's primary opponent was

the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Joseph Biden.
Biden, whose mediocre performance as a law student was receiving a
good deal of publicity at the time (his presidential candidacy collapsed
in part because of an accusation of plagiarism in law school), stood up
to the reputedly brilliant professor. 56 He countered Bork's academic
presentation with the simple and stunning image of police in bedrooms. 57 Since the Bork defeat, no Supreme Court nominee has disaf-

firmed the right of privacy, 58 and, of course, the right of privacy endures in the case law. Thus, George Bush may have won the election
and hence the power to make Supreme Court appointments, but the
Bork debacle implicitly constrained his choice: he would have to put
forward candidates who would not offend the people's sensibilities
about rights.59

The federal judiciary is subject to the shifting patterns of
presidential elections and confirmation hearings, which reflect public
sensibilities about the meaning of the Constitution,60 including love of
or hostility toward rights. It is thus a delusion to think the First
52. Id. at 993-94.
53. Id. at 994.
54. See Richard Benjamin Cramer, What It Takes: The Way to the White House 644
(Random House, 1992).
55. (Free, 1990).
56. See Cramer, What It Takes at 626-63 (cited in note 54).
57. Id. at 644.
58. See, for example, Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality at 672 (cited in note 29) (noting that
Justice Kennedy explicitly affirmed the right in his confirmation hearing), 689 (noting that
Justice Thomas refrained from expressing an opinion on Roe).
59. Note, for example, the warning issued by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan as he
voted against Robert Borc "I cannot support anyone for a Supreme Court appointment who
would not recognize [the right of privacy]." Id. at 671.
60. The Senators voting in the Bork confirmation knew the public's position from a Louis
Harris poll, which showed 68% of respondents reported themselves "worried" in response to a
statement that the Constitution does not protect a married couple's right to use birth control
and only 27% "not worried." Id. at 670.
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Amendment can be preserved through absolutism and federal control.
If rights are to be preserved it is crucial to continue to engage the
public in the discourse about rights. The First Amendment is in particular danger of losing public support, in part because of the
arrogance of those who administer it with clinical dispassion and
thwart those who are fervently engaged in a struggle against what
they perceive as profound harms. 61 It is not possible to remove the

First Amendment from this political fray.
Relaxation of ripeness doctrine in Hudnut permitted consideration of the pornography ordinance by a federal court at an early,
abstract stage, where First Amendment law could be articulated in a
cool, unemotional setting. The judges could peruse empirical studies
about the harms of pornography, without having to turn away any
real person litigating about a real harm. Is this the best way to protect the treasured values of the First Amendment?
Without the federal court decision, a period of uncertainty
would have ensued in one locality. Purveyors of graphically sexual
materials would need to worry about potential civil liability. Public
debate about the relationship between pornography and sexual assault, about the importance of free speech as opposed to other values,
and about the meaning of subordination and discrimination would go
on. Eventually, there would be a lawsuit, based on the state law
cause of action, which presumably would have to be heard in state
court.

62

At this point the state court, in this more concrete context,
would have the first say in analyzing the constitutional question,
subject to the ultimate review of the United States Supreme Court.
In all likelihood, the Supreme Court would still have invalidated the
ordinance. But it might also have shifted its standard for regulating
sexually graphic materials, to accord with a better view of why this
regulation is permissible, expressing a more compelling understanding of the harms of subordination and discrimination, rather than the
oddly puritanical concern for shocked sensibilities and unaccepted
61. A parallel struggle has occurred in the wake of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Persons who deeply and passionately oppose abortion make great efforts to influence elections
and the subsequent judicial appointments. If the public sentiment against abortion had been
stronger, we would by now have a majority of the Supreme Court committed to the right of a
fetus to be carried to term. There is nothing that any court sitting now can do to ensure that
this will not happen. Absolutism about rights will not necessarily preserve them: it may spur
on the political process that leads to the installation ofjudges who will deny them.
62. There would be no basis for federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the First
Amendment providing only a defense to the state law claim. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
Mattley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-54 (1908). There might conceivably be diversity jurisdiction,
depending on the citizenship of the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).

1994]

FEDERALISM, UNTAMED

1227

lust. Even aside from whether the ultimate statement of law would
differ, the longer process, more in touch with actually injured persons
and local institutions, might have produced the deeper sense of public
commitment to First Amendment rights that is necessary for their
endurance.
IV. CONCLUSION

Certainly, there is risk in abandoning control and embracing
an open-ended debate about rights. But in the interest of slapping
down the truly bad states, we may lose a salutary process. We may
still choose to make this sacrifice-we may prefer our federalism
tamed-but we ought at least to see that this is a choice that we
make. Yet even if we decide we want our federalism tamed, and we
try to constrain the state courts to the modest role of carrying out the
federal agenda, we should see that it is impossible to neaten up the
lawsaying process into final uniformity. While single pronouncements, applicable to everyone, may issue from the top of the pyramid
and exercise a powerful force on all decision makers who follow, a
multiplicity of voices will always reemerge, reinvigorating the process
with divergent impulses, interpreting and misinterpreting what has
gone before, soaking up the local passions and prejudices, ideas and
inspirations, and inevitably putting an uncontrolled, unpredictable
spin on what is to come.

